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This paper has emerged from a mapping of the evolution of media advocacy in South
Asia, with special emphasis on India. The mapping has four principal components:
Enumerating the instruments, institutions and actors in segments of the media industry;
Pinpointing key issues instilling debate in the post-1991 milieu, such as ‘autonomy’ and
‘community’; Identifying advocacy groups, their principal practices and preferred tools; and,
Reviewing donor activity directed at NGOs in each media sector. The sectors of the industry
covered under this exercise include the conventional ‘mass media’ (viz. television & radio)
and emergent domain of ‘informatics’ (i.e. internet, mobile telephony and software).
In launching into this exercise, we well recognise the methodological limitations of
tracking advocacy practices across South Asia. For one, the universe of sources is limited, as
many deliberations are orally transacted, and thus are devoid of comprehensive textual
documentation. This directs attention to not just untapped sources of advocacy analyses, such
as email lists, but the analytical potential of their concert with expert interviews and public
documents. This is but one rationale inspiring the conception of this project to give weight to
ventures between academics and activists, discomforting as such distinctions are. The project
is a collaborative effort between an NGO, the Digital Empowerment Foundation (DEF), and
an academic organisation, Centre for Culture, Media & Governance (CCMG) at Jamia Millia
Islamia, both leaders in their fields in India 1 . Such collaborations, infrequent in India, are
particularly suited to mapping advocacy practices, since the latter span the worlds of informal
and formal social action. They thus provide an enriched set of experiences towards reflecting
upon, and intervening in, debates on media policy.

1 See, www.defindia.net/ and www.jmi.nic.in/ccmg/index.html

This paper examines two trails of advocacy in the deregulated milieu of radio in India 2 .
One pivoted its efforts around a longstanding, albeit oft amorphous, motif in Indian society
and polity: namely, ‘community’; the other sought to extend dominant economic discourse of
our times into the sphere of radio: namely, ‘privatisation’. What bring these seemingly
distinct trails together are not just their efforts at de-monopolising the state media but their
common evocation of notions of Public Interest. The paper begins by sketching out the
institutional setting of media policy in India to familiarise the reader with the principal actors
at work. It then outlines key milestones in the deregulation of radio policy that led to the
advent of private FM stations and Community Radio stations---the varying rationales of each
being subsequently laid out. We then review this process to bring into relief their respective
trails of advocacy; and in doing so we pinpoint key contests, and flashpoints, within and
between these trajectories.

Actors, Institutions & Relationships

NEW INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS
Until a decade and a half ago, radio policy in India had evolved within the twin
frameworks of geography and scarcity. That is to say, the governance of All India Radio
(AIR) was conducted within the territorial framework of the nation-state, and hinged around
the logic of information and channel scarcity 3 . In contrast, today’s media milieu is
characterized by information abundance and multiplicity of platforms, and a tremendous
2 The state broadcaster, All India Radio (AIR) was formed in 1936 by the colonial government. Sixt years later, there were over 200 stations
comprising 145 MW, 55 SW and 103 FM transmitters---the first of the latter inaugurated in July 1977, at Madras (now Chennai). AIR
continues to broadcast in 24 languages and 146 dialects for domestic listeners, and in 15 foreign and 12 Indian languages for its foreign
services.
3

AIR has a three-tier organisational structure: National Stations broadcast centrally produced news bulletins in Hindi and
English, classical & light music, plays, commentaries on live sports and other talk shows. Regional Stations located in
different states dish out a programming mix similar to National Stations but in regional languages. Local Radio Stations,
starting in the early 1980s, were sought to be flexible operations, serving small areas and broadcast in regional languages and
dialects. This three-tier system, rickety at some places and staid at others, altogether covers over 90% of the country’s
population and over 80% of its geography.

increase in the role of private stakeholders. Consequently, the emergent milieu has given
birth to new historical actors and a fresh institutional dynamics mediating the relationship
between various stakeholders.
While these new institutional dynamics in the radio sector are yet to completely
crystallise, what is undoubtedly clear is that they involve a range of private stakeholders--and not state and para-governmental organisations alone, as hitherto. This has led to some
policy debates viewing the ‘retreat’ of the state as condition for the fructification of these new
actors. Rather than making a policy framework unnecessary, the deregulation of radio and the
fresh issues it has generated, has called for new protocols of policy formulation 4 . These
multifaceted trends pose some fundamental challenges to longstanding objectives of access,
equity and/or public good. This makes the overriding problematic in the contemporary media
milieu is that of governance. Not surprisingly, this has spurred the genesis and proliferation
of a fresh set of advocacy practices as well. The core challenge these practices confront is:
who will be involved in decisions about the future?
In the initial-run of deregulation in the communication industry, the state responded
through the Executive (via a Policy or an Ordinance)---rather than the Legislature (i.e.
through new or amended Acts) 5 . However, international bodies and national firms alike
demanded that the state could not partake as both, the arbitrator and commercial player 6 .
Thus, due to the compulsions of the altered macro-economic milieu, a historical shift
occurred in the governance of the emergent media environment. The regulatory aspects of the
communication industry moved out of the hands of the concerned administrative Ministries
The challenges confronting the early phase of media deregulation are brought together in, Monroe E. Price & Stefaan G.
Verhulst (Ed.) Broadcasting Reform in India: Media Law from a Global Perspective; OUP, New Delhi.
5
For instance, the National Telecom Policy of 1994 laid down guidelines to administer de-regulation in telecom---measures
enhanced through the New Telecom Policy of 1999, which additionally addressed aspects of pricing services, manufacturing
equipment, universal obligation, and timelines on further liberalisation. The Ordinance-route was deployed for Cable TV,
which saw numerous ad hoc measures in the early years. Although the Cable Television Network Rules, 1994 provided the
first set of guideline, only after the Cable T.V. Networks (Regulation) Act of 1995 did matters of ownership, pricing,
mandatory feeds and foreign investment started being addressed, however selectively.
6
As in regulated media of Europe and South East Asia, government departments/ministries in India were also managing
revenue-earning, public-sector and/or quasi-governmental entities in telecom, TV and radio.
4

to a landmark instrument: the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997. This Act
was a response to the geometrical expansion of the mobile telecom sector, and the related
glut of private actors; it covered the transmission/reception of all kinds of data through wired
or wireless mediums---except broadcasting services 7 . But in the ensuing institutional history
of TRAI, two substantial changes unfolded. First, learning from the bottlenecks in its
implementation, the Act was modified as the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India
(Amendment) Act, 2000. The amendment created an arbitration body, the ‘Telecom Disputes
Settlement & Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT) to mediate and quickly resolve disputes between
a licensor and licensee, between service providers, a service provider and consumers; it was
also to arbitrate appeals against decisions taken by TRAI 8 . Secondly, since TRAI was the
sole regulatory institution in the communications industry, over the years it became, by
default, the de facto regulator for other sectors of the informatic and media industries 9 .
Resultantly, TRAI has been producing consultative papers and recommendations on matters
ranging from community radio to digitalisation of cable distribution, from 3G mobile services
to trans-national satellite television.

RISE OF NON-STATE ACTORS
Unlike the state, the activities of private entrepreneurs in the media are not directly
accountable to citizens: their performance is not regularly validated through electoral
processes, nor is even a minimal level of transparency achievable through legal stipulations.
This calls for enumerating the role of various interest groups, besides broadcasters qua
broadcasters.
7

Its mandate ranged from recommending the need and timing for introducing new services and service providers, to
granting licenses & levying fees, ensuring technical efficiency, protecting consumer interests, settling disputes within the
industry and with the government.
8
see http://www.tdsat.nic.in/
9
The reasoning for this expanded mandate was two fold: first, since, like telephony, other sectors also hinged around the
transmission/reception of data, and disputes over and competition between technological formats, TRAI could play a similar
role for sectors other than telecom. Secondly, a common regulatory parameter for these diverse sectors and services was the
allocation of spectrum---to specific segments and to firms within each segment.

Foremost are specialised divisions dealing with the media industry within apex industryassociations. Over the last decade, the three apex industry associations in India---CII, FICCI
& ASSOCHAM---have shown varied degrees of engagement with the media industry. Their
potency stems from their capacity to involve actors with conflicting interests in arriving at
specific policy frameworks. In the media sphere, the most active of this trio, FICCI, conducts
two crucial advocacy exercises: an annual conference on the media industry, “Frames”, and
an annual Report on the industry, prepared by the Indian arm of the consulting firm
Pricewaterhouse Coopers.
Trade Bodies representing specific sectors and segments of the media industry are the
second fulcrum of advocacy. They provide a platform for firms to protect and further their
interests, advocate best practices, and mediate between domestic and trans-national
stakeholders. The Association of Radio Operators for India (until 2006 known as The Radio
Group) voices the concerns of major private FM broadcasters, and has taken up issues of
taxation, common charges and levies enforced by various arms of government 10 . Since an
overwhelming amount of air-time on private FM stations is music, The Indian Music Industry
Association (IMI) has emerged an important actor in the de-regulated media milieu in
general, and radio in particular 11 . Representing over 50 prominent national and trans-national
labels, constituting over 75% of the organised segment of this industry, the IMI has been
negotiating with FM stations, Internet portals and Telecom operators for mutually beneficial
financial and copyright arrangements; in this process, however, it has fallen short of carrying
along other stakeholders, especially the Performers Rights Association.
The third fulcrum of advocacy, especially during the deregulation of radio, surfaced

10

In April 2006, The Association of Radio Operators for India (AROI) got membership of the International Association of
Broadcasting, the global body of private FM broadcasters, which led to its integrating an international dimension to its
advocacy within India.
11
Perhaps more than in other countries, the significance of the music sector in India rests as much in its own dynamism as in
it being the principal ancillary to other sectors of the media industry viz. cinema, radio, television and increasingly, telecom;
see V. Parthasarathi (2007) “The Ecology of Creative Industries: The Indian Music Industry Un-played”, Report towards a National
Mission in Creative Industries; Asian Heritage Foundation, New Delhi.

outside private industry---amongst NGOs. From the VIII Plan considerable emphasis and
space was given to NGOs; government recognized that their initiatives, variously relying on
people’s active participation, had a greater chance of success. And by the X Plan, measures
were being taken to create an “enabling environment for the voluntary sector to collaborate
with Government for development” 12 . This incrementally created a scenario wherein NGOs--once located outside, even in opposition to, the apparatus of the state---got cumulatively
integrated with government’s planning protocols. In the specific segment of media-centric
initiatives by NGOs, the last 15 years has witnessed a growing realisation of the importance
of communication both as an instrumental and substantive activity. These were continuously
buttressed by changes in the broader deregulatory environment: the easier and affordable
availability of media technologies; and, the expanded support to media-related social
interventions by a host of bi-lateral, multilateral and private philanthropic organisations13 .
Like in Sri Lanka and Nepal, Community Radio campaigners in India formed an association
to synergise their interests: the Community Radio Forum (CRF) 14 . As the nodal agency for
advocacy, CRF facilitates an interface between the government, NGOs, industry and funding
agencies on the one hand, and helps organizations to set up Community Radio Stations.
Focus on CRF should not ignore the germination of sub-national advocacy groups, such as
the South India Community Media Network (SICMN) and a CR network within Maharashtra.
Irrespective of their current capabilities, they convey the emergence of multiple formations,
conceivably spurred by varying interests, within the CR campaign in India.
All in all, the rapidly transforming media milieu in India has churned out, with equal
rapidity, a fresh configuration of state and non-state actors. The latter have shown
12

One crucial step was to declare the Planning Commission as the nodal agency for the Government-NGO interface within
the formal apparatus of the state; Planning Commission (2002) Report of the Steering Committee on Voluntary Sector in the 10th Plan
(2002-07); Planning Commission, Government of India, New Delhi (May) p.10.
13
UNDP, Ford Foundation, ADB, WB, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), DFID, Free Voice, HIVOS,
USAIDS, UNESCO's IPDC, to name a few, have engaged with segments of civil society media in most South Asian
countries.
14
CRF came together through ‘CR-India’, a discussion list started in 2000 to consolidate the campaign to licence community
radio stations; see, www.crforum.in.

tremendous variation in their priorities and emphases on matters of governance---be it within
their respective segments/sectors, in their interaction with the state and in response to multilateral organisations like ITU, GATT, WIPO, UNCTAD etc. One of the difficulties in
gaining clarity on advocacy initiatives by both Corporations and NGOs is that they represent
diverse interest groups, practices and intents. Nevertheless, two questions call for exploration
while viewing the role of non-state actors. First: how do they seek to manage the
contradictory interests in the increasingly complex media industry, especially since policy
decisions on technology and commerce are often perceived to constitute a zero-sum game 15 ?
Second: since the plethora of stakeholders aim to establish, and/or further, particular regimes
of media governance, to what extent has the State been able to frame media policy in the
interest of the individuals---both, as consumers and citizens?
These questions nudge us to examine the anatomy of advocacy practices adopted by
different inter groups to deregulate radio--- viz. Union Ministries, the Regulator, Trade
Bodies and NGOs. In exploring these, it is fruitful to pay attention to instances where each
actor used the rationale, advocacy experience and policy thrust of the other to leverage their
own interests.

Towards De-Monopolisation

TRENDS OF DEREGULATION
In 1993, AIR started selling time slots on its programming cycle to private producers in
five cities. Such incipient deregulation in public infrastructure and privatisation of air-time
was similar to the measures undertaken in Doordarshan, the public TV broadcaster, during
15

Be it between sectors (say, Telecom Vs Internet, Radio Vs Music) or within a sector (producers, distributors, rights
holders et al).

mid 1980s 16 . But it took 7 years for the de-monopolisation of radio to unfold; in May 2000,
108 frequencies in the FM spectrum were auctioned to private broadcasters across 40 cities;
licenses were awarded for a ten-year period and escalations in license fees were set at 15%
per annum on the base of the first year fees17 . Issued on a non exclusive basis for free to air
broadcasts, the licenses barred airing of News, networking of stations across cities and
mandated 50% of programming be produced in India. Although the first private FM station
went on air in July 2001, by April 2004 services had commenced in only 14 cities by 24 radio
operators. Moreover, an overwhelming number of radio broadcasters---many of who lacked
experience in the media sector and/or broadcasting of any sort---found their nascent
enterprises unviable, primarily due to the high license fee; most of these reported their heavy
losses were likely to continue.
Help came in May 2002 from the Working Group on the Information and Broadcasting
Sector for the Formulation of the X Plan. It argued that treating the licensing of private FM as
a source of revenue for the Government was counter productive---as it hindered both, the
growth and roll out of private FM stations 18 . Conveniently sidelined was the fact that the
private broadcasters, who saw FM stations only as a source of revenue, had made uninformed and over-estimated bids in the I Phase of licensing---and resultantly, were in the
red. To reformulate policy for the II Phase of licensing, the government constituted the Radio
Broadcast Policy Committee (RBPC) in July 2003, headed by the Secretary General of the
apex industry body, FICCI. In February 2004, the Union Ministry of Information &
Broadcasting (MIB) sent the RBPC report to the regulator, TRAI---who had meanwhile
started on a Consultation Paper for the II Phase of FM licensing. Based on the experience of

For a recent writing on the de-regulation of TV in India, see Victoria L. Farmer (2009) ‘Nation, State, and Democracy in India:
Media Regulation and Government Monopoly’; Paper presented preconference ‘India and Communications Studies’, at the Annual Meet
of the ICA (May), Chicago, www.global.asc.upenn.edu/docs/ICA2009/VFarmer.pdf
17
Although 101 bids were received for an aggregate of Rs 425 crores, against estimates of Rs.79.65crores, the actual
collection for the public exchequer was only Rs.158.8 crores, as bidders of 64 frequencies defaulted.
18
Planning Commission (2002) Report of The Steering Committee on Communication and Information for The 10th Five-Year Plan (200207)’; Planning Commission, Government of India, New Delhi (May)
16

the I Phase, and the views of principal stakeholders---the Ministry, TRAI and Industry---the
II Phase of licensing was set into motion in July 2005; it ambitiously targeted spreading
private FM stations to 92 cities across India.
The emergence of Community Radio on the horizon of policy options was not isolated.
Rather, it emerged very much from the piecemeal process of de-monopolisation of not only
Radio in general but of FM frequencies in particular. In December 2002 the MIB released
Community Radio Guidelines for “well established educational institutions”. Barred from
airing news and advertisements, these ‘Campus Radio’ stations were seen as the fourth tier in
the national radio network---along with AIR, IGNOU 19 and Private FM stations. In
approving these guidelines, the Union Cabinet failed to recollect past initiatives at local
broadcasting by AIR, commencing nearly two decades ago 20 .
In May 2004, the MIB organised a workshop on ‘designing an enabling framework for
community radio', thereby tacitly admitting the limitations of its Campus Radio initiative 21 .
The Workshop resulted in a set of inputs that fed the draft Community Radio Policy
subsequently drawn up by the Ministry 22 . Meanwhile, TRAI had embarked on its earlier
promise of preparing a separate Consultation Paper on Community Radio, released in August
2004. More than two years later, in November 2006, the new Community Radio Policy got
finally notified; it contained the long-standing demand by NGOs of permitting non-profit
organisations to initiate Community Radio (CR) stations. Like with private FM, News was
barred on CR but limited advertising and announcements on local events, businesses and

19

In 2000 government allowed IGNOU to set up FM stations in 40 cities for educational broadcast, of which only 10 radio
stations are in operation.
20
Following the successful introduction of a local radio station in Nagercoil (Tamil Nadu) in 1984, over 70 others were set
up by AIR by 1999. Overtime, many of these started relaying national programmes, thus defeating their conceptual and
operational foundations. For an ethnography of one such local station of AIR, see Jayaprakash, Y.T (2000) ‘Remote audiences
beyond 2000: Radio, everyday life and development in South India’; International Journal of Cultural Studies Vol. 3/2 (pp.227–239)
21
Much like private FM stations, the first Campus Radio at Anna University, in Chennai, reflected the inability of the
broadcaster to manage the large capital cost of operation (Rs.12-15 lakhs) and annual expenditure on three hours of
programming a day; TRAI (2004) ‘Consultation Paper On Licensing Issues Relating to Community Radio Stations’; Consultation Paper,
Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, New Delhi, (August 25) p.13.
22
They covered key concerns of NGOs: permitting communities through legal entities to start CR stations, airing local news
and using advertisements.

employment opportunities got the green signal.
Clearly, the processes of formulating FM and CR policy were equally long drawn, and
faced comparable setbacks in their initial phases of operation. Central to our concerns in this
paper is not merely how open—commercially or ideologically—the radio sphere is; rather,
under what conditions was this domain de-monopolised, the kinds of interests radio
frequencies are deregulated for, and the directions of further policy thrusts. This directs us to
examine the differences between the FM & CR experiences in India: viz. the salience of its
stakeholders, their involvement in crucial stages of policy reformulation, and their distinct
relationships with the formal apparatus of the state. To do so, also implies examining the
plethora of rationales adopted by the proponents of FM and CR for deregulating radio--especially since both invoked notions of public interest.

THE RATIONALE OF PRIVATISATION
In continuation of the policy of liberalization, the Government initiated discussions on
deregulating the Radio sector during the IX Plan (1997-2000). Besides aiming to improve the
variety of content on AIR, the sole radio broadcaster at the time, a shift in emphasis from
MW to FM was proposed, due to the “superior quality of FM transmission” 23 . And it was in
opening up FM frequencies that the government visualised the role of Indian companies to
set up private radio stations on a license fee basis. This de-monopolisation of FM was aimed
at commercial entities expanding the canvas of entertainment, education and information
dissemination, through programming that would be localized in content and relevance. This
approach was adopted to encourage new talent and employment opportunities, while
simultaneously to supplement the efforts of AIR in rapidly expanding radio networks across

TRAI (2004) ‘Consultation Paper On Licensing Issues Relating to 2nd Phase Of Private FM Radio Broadcasting’; Consultation Paper
No. 8 /2004, Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, New Delhi, (April); The 10th Plan raised this point as well; Planning Commission
(2002) 10th Five Year Plan (2002-2007); Planning Commission, Government of India, New Delhi (Dec.) p.1012.
23

the country 24 .
Two years after private FM commenced and stations were found to be financially
bleeding, government deemed the License Fee model a failure. Government explained this
failure on count of it treating FM frequencies as source of revenue for the public exchequer--a move that was, in turn, reasoned to have also hindered both the growth and roll out of this
segment in radio 25 . In weighing policy options, government was caught between the desire to
continue encouraging private sector participation in broadcasting and the dangers of
allocating frequencies to private interests at an undervalued price. Although a key rationale
for deregulating FM was education---as reiterated in the X Plan document 26 ---the onus of
such non-commercial ventures was implicitly placed on AIR and IGNOU. It is an
unexplainable irony that government stipulations encouraged private operators to initiate FM
stations services in metros and small cities---i.e. in those very areas which, while extensively
covered by AIR, constituted the most lucrative markets for advertisements. Despite such
covert support to private broadcasters and having migrated to a revenue sharing mechanism
in the II Phase of Licensing, the desired outcomes did not precipitate. The Sub-Group on
Information and Broadcasting formulating the XI Plan (2007-2012) duly noted that FM
services had failed to cover 60% of the population---one of the major targets of the X Plan 27 .
As its first concerted, and officially sanctioned, advocacy initiative, the Report of the
Radio Broadcast Policy Committee (RBPC), submitted in November 2003, recognised that
broadcasting freedom involved a delicate balance between various interests. Emphasising that

TRAI (2004) ‘Consultation Paper On Licensing Issues Relating to 2nd Phase Of Private FM Radio Broadcasting’; Consultation Paper
No. 8 /2004, Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, New Delhi, (April) p.1
25
Planning Commission (2002) Report of The Steering Committee on Communication and Information for The 10th Five-Year Plan (200207); Planning Commission, Government of India, New Delhi (May) p. 44. TRAI also explained the delay in rollout and growth of FM
services on the same count; TRAI (2004) ‘Consultation Paper on Licensing Issues Relating to 2nd Phase Of Private FM Radio
Broadcasting’; Consultation Paper No. 8 /2004, Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, New Delhi, (April 14) p3.
26
Planning Commission (2002) 10th Five Year Plan (2002-2007); Planning Commission, Government of India, New Delhi (Dec.).
27
Planning Commission (2007) Working Group Report of 11th Five Year Plan (2007-12) on Information and Broadcasting Sector; Planning
Commission, Government of India, New Delhi (January) pp.60-62.
24

ensuring diversity of content by private broadcasters was a key objective of privatisation in
radio, it reviewed the I Phase of FM licensing as follows:
It has been observed that all the FM channels are increasingly offering similar
content (usually only Hindi film music) and sound alike. Niche channels (like
classical music) have not been developed by the private FM broadcasters. The
reason cited by industry players for such standardization of content is that
advertising is the only source of revenue and advertisement revenue is
determined by the audience of the particular channel. High license fees structure
has forced the licensees to provide content that appeals to all sections across
society rather than a special interest group in society. 28
In pinpointing the causes behind the commercial failure of the inaugural phase, the RBPC
was more forthright than the government. It reasoned this to have been on count of (a)
speculative bidding due to absence of stiff penalty clauses on withdrawal; (b) post-bidding
variation in the Tender Documents and the LOI/ License Agreement and (c) inappropriate
forfeiture clauses which provided easy exit options to the industry players. Optimistic about
these lacunae being addressed in the II Phase of Licensing through a strong contractual and
policy framework, the RBPC advocated a migration of the license terms from a fixed fee
basis to a one-time entry fee, and an annual revenue sharing arrangement with the
government 29 .
While TRAI saw in the RBPC the government warranting changes in the II Phase, it took
exception to, and/or differed with, some views of this industry-dominated committee 30 . The
regulator’s review of licensing, regulatory and competitive frameworks of the I Phase of
RBPC Report quoted in TRAI (2004) ‘Consultation Paper On Licensing Issues Relating to 2nd Phase Of Private FM Radio
Broadcasting’; Consultation Paper No. 8 /2004, Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, New Delhi, (April 14) p.49.
29
TRAI (2004) ‘Consultation Paper On Licensing Issues Relating to 2nd Phase Of Private FM Radio Broadcasting’; Consultation Paper
No. 8 /2004, Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, New Delhi, (April 14) p.4. It visualised increasing the viability of private FM
stations by reviewing certain restrictions and terms in the Tender Documents and the License Agreement---such as the
duration of the license, restriction on FDI, restriction on transmission of news and current affairs, restriction on multiple
licenses in one centre, vary the revenue sharing arrangement every five years, etc.
30
Importantly, the RBPC omitted cross-media issues.
28

licensing in 2004 directed attention to design “suitable corrective policy measures” in the 2nd
phase of FM Licenses 31 . Instead of fresh thinking, TRAI limited its “overarching objective”
to devising ways to implement the goals set out by the government in the X Plan: i.e.
providing access to FM radio to 60% of the population, encouraging private sector players,
and moving to a revenue sharing mechanism 32 . But unlike the government, the regulator was
upfront in recognising the existing, limited reach of private FM will make it be difficult for
“this part of the industry to contribute significantly to the task of achieving the 60% coverage
target” 33 . Since this required private resources to supplement AIR’s efforts, TRAI was
categorical that such resources could be attracted only “by keeping entry costs low” 34 . Thus,
for TRAI, any strategy to achieve the objectives of the X Plan had to include, inter alia,
“keeping the revenue angle as secondary in importance”; this was estimated to enable, not
only a growth in FM radio but, the public exchequer to gain two fold---viz. by increases in
overall quantum of license fees and by increases in the service tax from advertisers 35 .
Surprisingly, when it came to AIR, TRAI reversed its standpoint on revenue being a
secondary consideration. Drawing attention to AIR being exempt from entry fees or license
fees---since it provided non-commercial services as well---TRAI visualised that “at some
stage in the future this will need to be done, in the interest of level playing field conditions”.
Implicit here was the regulator’s intention to strengthen private FM stations by proposing to
only reduce their cost of entry but also erecting fresh barriers for the public broadcaster.

TRAI (2004) ‘Consultation Paper On Licensing Issues Relating to 2nd Phase Of Private FM Radio Broadcasting’; Consultation Paper
No. 8 /2004, Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, New Delhi, (April 14) p.3.
32
TRAI (2004) Recommendations on Licensing Issues Relating to 2nd Phase of Private FM Radio Broadcasting; Telecom Regulatory
Authority of India, New Delhi (Aug.) p.7
33
At present AIR has 140 stations covering about 33% of the population. As against this, the population of all the 40 towns
that had been put on bid for the private sector in Phase I was only 10.20%; TRAI (2004) Recommendations on Licensing Issues
Relating to 2nd Phase of Private FM Radio Broadcasting; Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, New Delhi (Aug.) p.7.
34
TRAI backed this by quoting distinct experiences: the international experience of private FM to show the prevalence of
both, low license fees and revenue share model; and, the national experience of the telecom sector, to illustrate that as
license fees dropped, the market expanded and the government ultimately got more revenues than if a high license fees
structure remained.
35
TRAI (2004) Recommendations on Licensing Issues Relating to 2nd Phase of Private FM Radio Broadcasting; Telecom Regulatory
Authority of India, New Delhi (Aug.) p.8
31

INTEGRATING MARGINAL STAKEHOLDERS
While both the IX Plan and its end-Plan Review were silent about CR, the Steering
Committee on Communication and Information for the 10th Plan (2002-2007) envisaged
“Low Power community radio stations” in FM mode by local communities and non-profit
organizations such as Universities 36 . This was an extension of the government’s belief in the
“Superior quality of FM transmission” observed in the IX Plan, and another illustration of its
attempts at expanding the sphere of FM broadcasts, as observed by the X Plan Steering
Committee 37 . The Working Group towards the XI Plan was categorical on community
broadcasting being expanded to include elementary education programmes 38 . Taking cue, the
XI Plan visualised a spurt in CR on the premise that permitting NGOs (limited) commercial
advertising time will make stations self-sustaining, and low capital investments would enable
NGOs to cater to populations in the 5 to 10 kilometre radius “fairly intensively” 39 .
One of the terms of reference to the RBPC was to examine the possibility of noncommercial, non-advertisement driven channels, to be operated by private FM broadcasters.
Weighing the option of stipulating 10% of broadcast time on private FM stations for noncommercial programming, the RBPC realised this could run into problems of defining,
scheduling and monitoring ‘non-commercial’ content. As a pragmatic alternative, the RBPC
proposed 25% of the revenue share received by the government from FM broadcasters be set
apart in a separate fund to develop non-commercial channels. Thus, RBPC obliquely hinted
against the necessity of CR stations---possibly due to them competing for the advertising pie
sustaining private broadcasters. In doing so, the RBPC was proposing an expanded role for
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private FM stations that would, importantly, draw on the public exchequer---thereby weaning
away resources from some services of AIR as well.
Taking up this matter in its Consultation Paper on FM II Phase, TRAI felt reserving
additional frequencies for such non-commercial but privately owned stations will further
constrain the availability of FM spectrum. In the ensuing deliberations, some industry
stakeholders suggested the frequency for non-commercial channels in cities be reserved, and
tendered-for separately with a low reserve fee and lower percentage of revenue share. But
when TRAI rightly amplified the fact that such programming was already being carried out
on AIR channels, the carefully cultivated propositions by RBPC met a quiet burial.
As an alternative, TRAI proposed creating and incentivising special purpose licenses, or
mandating each private FM licensee to have a certain timeslot for non-commercial
programming 40 . But at that juncture, TRAI also observed that the objectives relating to
educational programmes in particular---harped upon by the government---and community
development in general were to some extent met by the existing framework 41 . Elaborating on
this, TRAI noted:
“Markets may not be able to provide all the content that may be desirable. For
such content there has to be a way of providing and promoting such content. It
is not necessary to provide a separate channel or station for such content and
these can very well be grafted on to the existing channels. It is also possible that
AIR can do this work. However this issue can be delinked from the current
process which is aimed at promoting the growth of private FM radio, and more
specifically the licensing conditions for Phase II. 42
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While TRAI endorsed the practice of NGOs buying time on AIR to broadcast their
programmes---a practice defined as ‘Community Audio Projects’---it had quietly been
questioning the rationale of such organisations to demand separate CR stations 43 .
These contradictory viewpoints got clarified in TRAI’s separate Consultation Paper on
CR---a demand first raised by NGOs during deliberations on the II Phase of FM Licensing.
Going against its earlier position, TRAI argued that since AIR catered to the needs of the
majority of audience through a centralized program production, it was not possible for it to
take up “issues affecting small communities” 44 . Resultantly, facilitating ‘participatory
community development’ and strengthening the vacuum at the local level was pointed out as
the core objective of CR: viz. local languages/dialects, showcasing local cultural expression,
exchange & discussion on relevant local issues, acting as a watchdog on civic authorities
etc 45 .
This brings home some traction between TRAI’s rationale for CR and that of donor
agencies in the development sector, some of who had championed the cause of CR since the
mid 1990s. At the forefront was UNESCO, which dovetailed the necessity of CR with its
wider, strategic objectives in the Communication & Information Sector: i.e. promoting the
free flow of ideas, universal access to information and cultural diversity in the media. On its
part, PANOS South Asia, increasingly concentrating on local language media across South
Asia, explained the efficacy of CR due to its “cheap and easily accessible” infrastructure; its
emphasis on CR stemmed from its strategic objectives of keeping public interest as the
governing principle, and inclusion as a key modality 46 .
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Supported by UNESCO, amongst the initiators of public debates on CR was the NGO,
VOICES 47 ; it imagined CR as a media hub that could be “the nerve centre of social and
economic activity and development in the village” 48 . Delving further, Charkha---an early
mover in the community audio project space---was driven by the belief that such initiatives
would enable “their issues reach the higher corridors of power, in Jharkhand and New
Delhi” 49 . In a similar vein, for One World South Asia, CR was an instrument for people to
attain entitlements; being able to inform citizens about welfare programs would, in turn, help
“the government in analyzing and implementing its social development programs” 50 . In
contrast, Drishti Media Collective saw CR as part of wider efforts at democratising the
airwaves, and at strengthening community rights 51 . Others like Deccan Development Society
spun a discourse which integrated CR within the broader canvas of their existing social
interventions 52 .
Moving from intent to institutions, the kernel of CR lay in the issue of entities considered
eligible to run stations. Addressing this, however, runs straight into the conceptual and
empirical maze of the idea of ‘the community’. It is crucial to recall that the idea of
‘community’, and even ‘community radio’, can be coherently traced back to earliest policy
debates over the introduction of radio in colonial India 53 . In the milieu of late colonialism
there were contrasting conceptions of ‘community’ by British romanticists and by
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Gandhians---albeit equally signifying ‘interpretative’ notions of community 54 . In postBritish, post-partition India, amidst successive permutations of communication technologies
and modernization emphases, the community retained its locus. But it did so purely
instrumentally: ‘the community’ formed the laboratory for the centripetal deployment of
radio as a ‘development tool’ 55 ; and, the citing of radio receivers within the domestic, rural
environment was aimed at connecting the family and home with the nation-state. Guided by
the requirements of nation-building and the objectives of modernisation, this signified the
imagination of an ‘improvised’ community 56 .
Perhaps because of this political and intellectual legacy, and despite the consensus on the
non-profit nature of CR today, there lurks an amorphous idea of ‘community’---evident also
in CR discourses in neighbouring Bangladesh 57 . It may be argued that the difficulties in
engaging with the idea of ‘community’ resulted in NGOs in India insisting the necessity of
intermediaries--with well-defined legal status---in cradling CR stations. But there was also
agreement among advocates that CR should not imply ‘NGO Radio’---a viewpoint sharply
differentiating the Indian scenario with Bangladesh 58 . This fuelled the need to widen the
range of entities eligible for CR licenses. For instance, at the consultations hosted by One
World South Asia, the case for Gram Panchayats and other local bodies like village Self Help
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Groups being eligible was vigorously forwarded 59 . However, at the MIB consultations, it was
felt that this would be counter-productive: since one of the functions of CR was envisaged to
assess and report on the local administration, and a station owned by such entities would be
unable to bring an impartial perspective 60 . Thus, it is clear that where conceptions of
community drew on coherent juro-administrative frames, the matter has proved to be
extremely contentious.
Deliberations on eligibility provoke two observations. First, media scholarship has rarely
attempted to rigorously engage with the notion of community. Invariably scholars have
approached this simply in terms of a ‘territorially bound group with some commonality of
interests’ 61 . That this can equally be said for the audience for urban FM radio broadcasters
brings us back to the conceptual impasse over ‘community’ in media research 62 . Secondly,
the problematic of eligible entities reflects the yawning gap between the normative
underpinnings of CR and the extent to which marginal groups participate in the management
of these stations. For instance, the decade-old experiences of CR in Nepal show NGO and
Cooperative radio stations acting in the community’s interest and providing public interest
programming; yet, many are observed to lack truly participatory and/or representative
organisational structures 63 . Such a deficit is antithetical to the original, community-oriented
objectives of its proponents. Simultaneously, its prevalence points to a central tension of our
times: viz. on the one hand there is little doubt that the shift from government to governance
in recent years has created opportunities for disadvantaged groups to contribute to, if not
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participate in, some decisions which affect their lives; however, there is equally little doubt
that such groups have largely, continued to remain on the margins 64 .
Moving beyond participation, much like in the CR segment, for FM stations too
audiences are not simply listeners of programmes; they are members of families &
households, skilled & unskilled, educated & uneducated. They constitute and are constituted
by gender, age, class & language, and listen radio doing other things and in competition with
other things. But unlike CR, and like national and trans-national media industry, FM stations
are driven to enlarge the arena of ‘commercial speech’---finely nuanced from ‘free speech’ 65 .
For private broadcasters, the search for an audience is not a search for a unitary psychological
or social object. Thus, the idea of ‘community’ informing private FM broadcasters is neither
that of ‘improvised’ community---as with, say, farm radio in the era of developmentalism in
India---nor purely ‘interpretative’, as with CR advocates. Rather, it is conveys the third type
noted in the construction of ‘community’: the ‘embedded’ community 66 . This typology lends
a sharper lens to view the trajectories of various advocacy practices by the proponents of FM
and CR. Such sharpness will be helpful further on in this paper in distinguishing their
advocates’ seemingly common invocation of public interest while furthering their divergent
objectives.

Trajectories of Advocacy
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Having introduced the stakeholders and outlined their oft varying, oft complementary
rationale for private FM and CR stations, let us now follow the two trails of advocacy
launched by their principal stakeholders.

VOICES FROM CORPORATE INDIA
In 2002, a little over a year after the first FM station got operational, broadcasters began
suggesting a migration from licence fee to revenue sharing model; they claimed that since
their revenues were not adequate, the high license fee was not justified. In April 2003, The
Radio Group---as the AROI was then known---requested the MIB to relax their license fee
payment, lower entry fee and evolve a migration package for existing stations. Subsequently,
supported by their financial reports showing losses, they called for a task force with
representation from industry and government to look into framing an industry-friendly policy
guideline. Expanding the canvas of advocacy, the very next month five FM players made a
joint representation to the Union Law minister on licensing fee structure, since by then the
matter was under its purview. This strategy bore success, as government constituted the
Radio Broadcast Policy Committee (RBPC) under the chairmanship of the FICCI head in
July 2003 67 . Its Report in November 2003 recommended migrating to the ‘revenue share’
model, permitting the broadcast of news and current affairs programming and a cap of 26%
on FDI, including that on foreign debt funding, NRI and overseas corporate bodies).
Worried about their bottom-line towards the end of the financial year, on 11th February
2004 five broadcasters submitted a representation to the government to defer their Annual
License fee until the RBPC’s report emerged and Government took a decision on its
implementation. Since this issue was by now intimately linked with the recommendation on
Phase II licensing, towards which TRAI was preparing a consultation paper, TRAI issued an
67
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interim recommendation on 5th April 2004 giving the option to existing/Phase I licensees to
defer their next instalment of fees 68 . In April 2004 the Entertainment Network (India)
Limited---the FM radio arm of the newspaper conglomerate The Times of India---moved a
Mumbai court for a stay on encashment of bank guarantee in case of non-payment of licence
fee 69 . Upon their plea being refused by the court, and not wanting to loose momentum, five
FM stations took their case to the industry tribunal, TDSAT. The tribunal ruled that the
companies had to pay four months licence fee as an interim measure 70 . Having exhausted
both the Court and sectoral Tribunal, on 22nd April these broadcasters wrote to the MIB to
hold in abeyance the payment of the annual licence fee in line with the interim
recommendation of TRAI” 71 . In June, FM companies made a representation to MIB for a
faster implementation of the RBPC’s recommendations; government did not give any
assurance on the matter and asked the companies to pay the licence fee as per the TDSAT
order 72 .
TRAI’s consultation paper on FM, released in August 2004, provided a glimmer of hope
as in January 2005 the Delhi High Court asked the government to clarify the time frame
within which migration to a revenue-sharing regime will be implemented. Yet, the same court
dismissed petitions filed by three private operators to direct the government to arrive at a
decision on TRAI’s recommendations. Illustrating the new institutional framework of media
governance, the Court suggested the Telecom Dispute Settlement Appellate Tribunal
(TDSAT) to be the apt forum to address such issues. 73 In March 2005, the broadcasters
moved TDSAT, arguing that government inaction or delay on TRAI’s recommendations was
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resulting in financial losses 74 . Buying the argument, TDSAT set a deadline of 26th April for
the government to come up with an answer 75 . In April, TDSAT passed an order directing the
government to finalise its views on the RBPC report by early July 76 .
This course of events indicates that during the early years of deregulation of radio,
Litigation and Dispute Settlement were the preferred instruments of private broadcasters to
protect, and further, their interests. This strongly mimics the institutional trajectory of
deregulation in Mobile Telephony during the mid 1990s 77 . However, unlike in Telephony,
the Courts predominantly stuck behind the government on substantial matters---perhaps
reflecting a latent coherence of opinion towards Radio---while pressing the Executive to
resolve matters in a limited timeframe.
Having successfully steered the governance regime to a revenue sharing model, we see a
major shift in the focus of advocacy. In August 2005, a FICCI delegation met the Union I&B
Minister to implore changes in FM guidelines, including modifications in eligibility criteria;
norms for calculation of revenues; time frame for transfer of shares; and co-location of
transmission facilities, permitting mergers and acquisitions after three years of operation
instead of five, and allowing airing of News on a pilot basis. This shift in advocacy got a shot
in the arm after broadcasters bid optimistically for licenses in the II Phase, in January 2006.
At FICCI’s annual media industry meet, ‘Frames’, in March 2006, broadcasters started
pushing on other fronts: viz. permitting multiple frequencies, airing news and current affairs,
and a listenership measurement system.
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After the bids in the II Phase were announced, in November 2006, advocacy got centred
around two issues. First, as FICCI’s memorandum to the MIB in June 2007 reflects, the
rationale for allowing news underwent a fresh spin: arguing that radio was ‘the medium of
the under privileged’, it pointed out that this was the sole mass media barred from news.
Secondly, FDI norms came under intense debate: not only was radio in general subjected to
the lowest FDI cap amongst all News media but the FM segment additionally suffered from
unequal FDI stipulations vis-à-vis Satellite radio. Even AROI, normally focussing on other
issues, called for a higher FDI cap, since that for newspapers and TV News-channels was
beyond 25%. This was an integral element of the shift in priorities of industry-advocates: viz.
from highlighting license fee and revenue sharing issues, to vocalising financial and
corporate issues of the radio industry, as typified in mature markets.
Secondly, resolving rights between the radio and music segments of the media industry
received a heightened importance. In the post RBPC years, while FICCI was spearheading
structural aspects and protocols of licensing, AROI canvassed around negotiating for better
deals on music rights, besides unifying all FM broadcasters78 . Nevertheless, the FICCI Radio
Forum 79 sent a memorandum to the MIB in December 2007 to mediate on the issue of music
rights. This was a clear indication of the hesitancy, or inability, of the pan-sectoral entity,
FICCI, to arbitrate the clashing interests between constituent, sectoral stakeholders. On its
part, AROI had been under pressure from the trade body of the music industry, IMI, to arrive
at mutually beneficial norms for licensing and copyright in recorded music. In early March
2006, AROI petitioned the government on rationalising music rights fee; on 29th March, it
formed a committee to look into music royalty, alleging the Phonographic Performance Ltd.
(PPL) and other music rights organization were overlooking the fact that a uniform rights fee
78
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could not be applied on small and big radio operators alike. In December 2007, AROI
pleaded with MIB that the existing formula of FM operators paying 15 to 50 percent of their
annual revenue as music royalty fees, was above the global benchmark of 2 to 3 percent.
Thus, despite demanding greater deregulation from the state, AROI---akin to FICCI---was
forced to revert to the state to mediate inter-sectoral issues.

CAMPAIGNS BY NGOS
Much before deregulation in radio was thought of, and just after the initial deregulation
in television, a group of policy planners, media professionals and NGOs gathered in
Bangalore to reflect on the relevance and possibilities of CR in India. This meeting in
September 1996 was close on the heels of the landmark 1995 SC judgment on ‘airwaves
being public property’. The ensuing ‘Bangalore Declaration’ formed the inaugural basis of
advocacy on CR 80 ; and a coalition of NGOs played mid-wife to ‘CRF’, the national
campaign group formed to act as a nodal agency for “democratising radio” 81 .
Two months after the FM frequencies were auctioned to the first set of private
broadcasters, UNESCO sponsored a workshop in Hyderabad, and in the rural hinterland of
Pastapur in July 2000. The more concrete ‘Pastapur Declaration on Community Radio’ was
framed to urge the government to create a three-tier structure of radio broadcasting in India--viz. State-owned public radio (AIR); private commercial, FM radio; and, non-profit CR. And
the latter was distinguished by three elements: non-profit making, community ownership &
management, and community participation82 . The next month, Deccan Development Society
(DDS) established a radio station and became the first to apply for a radio license to the MIB--where no policy protocols existed! 83 In June 2001, MYRADA, another NGO applied for a
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license to set up a CR at Budhikote, about 100 km from Bangalore, Karnataka. Although like
DDS this too failed to evoke any response from the government 84 , by March 2003 NGOs
working in the village of Budhikote had managed to set up a community audio project,
managed by its members. Led by the NGOs, VOICES and MYRADA, and supported by
UNESCO the audio service ‘Namma Dhwani’ (our voice) was piped out in collaboration with
the local cable operator, which enabled 200 of the 650 village households to listen to
programmes on their TV sets 85 .
It is extremely noteworthy that, unlike in the FM segment, some NGOs started services
before specific norms were in place, albeit the ‘Namma Dwani’ experiment did not flout
wider norms in the broadcasting sphere 86 . This along with other experiments in community
audio projects---at once signifying an intervention and advocacy---reveal a distinct
understanding and usage of ‘radio’ as a medium 87 . Besides demonstrating divergent
imaginations of radio, these practices convey divergent compulsions of actualising CR as a
technological enterprise. It is in these contexts that fresh imagination emerged from a
proposition to combine Internet and Satellite technology that---instead of defying---bypass
legal restrictions 88 .
But the guidelines on CR issued by the government in 2003 came as a disappointment
for NGOs, as it restricted licenses to ‘well-established’ educational institutions’---who
themselves were restricted to broadcast News and Advertisements. This led NGOs to direct
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their advocacy at opening CR specifically for community based groups. From February
through October 2004, NGOs engaged in consultations on CR Policy; in parallel an
electronic initiatives was launched in June 2004 as a platform for news updates89 . All these
efforts were synthesized in November 2004, when NGOs submitted recommendations to
TRAI towards its long-promised consultation paper on CR. Released in Aug 2004, the CP
drew heavily from formulations of draft CR policy prepared jointly by the NGOs in May.
A little over a decade after the landmark Supreme Court judgment on airwaves, in
December 2005 a petition by the Community Radio Forum was signed by more than 50,000
people from around the country and sent to the Prime Minister urging changes in its current
policy 90 . Nearly a year later the massively revised CR policy was announced, on 16th
November 2006. The spokesperson of CRF was jubilant that India becomes the first country
in South Asia to have a separate policy for community radio 91 . But there was dis-satisfaction
among some members who, while pointing at two shortcomings, insisted a policy was no
substitute for legislation 92 .
In February 2007, Community Radio Forum was registered and the first annual
conference of CRF-India was held at New Delhi. Brining together NGOs, academics,
Government officials and Funding organizations, the meet discussed opportunities and
hurdles likely to be faced by those setting up CR station. Towards mainstreaming the debate,
UNESCO together with PLAN International, CARE-India and One World South Asia,
organized another, ore technical meet at the sidelines of BES EXPO ’07, an International
www.communityradionetwork.org
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Technological Event hosted by the Broadcasting Engineering Society of India (BES). On 6-7
March, 2007 the MIB with UNESCO organised a similar technical workshop for potential
Community Radio Operators; building on this, in April, UNESCO promised $ 60,000 from
its International Programme for the Development of Communication towards establishing 10
CR stations, especially in tribal belts. This illustrated a mode of funding non-commercial
radio in contrast to that envisaged by the RBPC’s Report and TRAI’s consultation paper.
Keeping in mind the Government’s lofty intention to establish 4000 community radio stations
by 2008, UNESCO also brought out a technical manual “Community Radio: A User’s Guide
to the Technology’ for potential CR operators.
But UNESCO was not the only entity conducting national-level advocacies. Throughout
2007-08, MICCI 93 organised seminars in several parts of the country to explore aspects of
Community Radio and frame guidelines for better execution and sustainability of CR
ventures. Besides national-level initiatives, there were regional ones as well. In July 2007,
Panos South Asia held a workshop in Shillong (Meghalaya) to increase awareness in the
Northeastern states about CR, and reflect on successful existing models, such as those in
Nepal. Similarly, for NGOs working in Andhra Pradesh, the Deccan Development Society, in
association with CRF-India and assisted by UNESCO, held a residential workshop on
‘Operationalising Community Radio’ in October 2007.
In 2008 February, CRF organised its II annual conference in Bangalore, and was
followed by a two-day, hands-on workshop "Technology for Radio" by VOICES---part of the
gradual shift in such meets from deliberating on values to capacity-creation. At its III annual
conference in February 2009, CRF transformed its structure from a loose network to a
formalised organisation, with a core team of representatives from many states. Evaluations of
experiences in Nepal point to reflect similar trends in the emergence of the Community Radio
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Support Centre (CRSC), and the Association of Community Radio Broadcasters (ACORAB)
who respectively specialised in capacity-building and advocacy 94 . Going a step further, CRF
planned a consortium of existing CR stations to collectively negotiate advertising rates with
agencies. This signified CRF’s preparation for a dialogue with ‘the market’ in a manner
strikingly similar to that by AROI to collectivize small FM broadcasters and negotiate with
advertising agencies. These separate initiatives---despite their distinct social contexts---bring
to light the co-evolution of instruments of advocacy and an advocacy group in India 95 . They
illustrate how representative bodies are able to incrementally devise mechanisms to sustain
their relevance, and thereby legitimate themselves as key political actors.

Contrapuntal Pulls

In the last part of this paper, we bring into greater relief the counteracting currents in
advocacy, within and between the FM and CR segments of radio. While our narrative
hitherto has touched upon these variations that played out amongst stakeholders, as also over
the duration of the deregulatory processes, attention now will be directed divergence on
select, specific issues.
While discussing modes of funding to support non-commercial channels, TRAI was
advocating a policy option considered akin to the ‘USO Fund’ in the Telecom Sector 96 --which, inter alia, was seen to contribute to content diversity in general. But in the same
breadth, TRAI hinted that the government---and not the public broadcaster---would be the

Pringle, Subba (2007) op cit p.17
This understanding of ‘co-evolution’ borrows and builds on its usage in an analyses of the Internet in China; it is argued
that while the technology facilitated new possibilities for citizen participation, civil society facilitated the proliferation of the
Internet by providing the necessary citizens and citizen-groups for interaction; see Guobin Yang (2003) ‘The Co-Evolution of the
Internet and Civil Society in China’; Asian Survey Vol. 43, No. 3 (pp.405-422)
96
In Telecom, the NTP’99 had laid down specific targets for the Fund’s usage. The Fund’s size was to be 5% of the
Adjusted Gross Revenue; including this levy as a part of license fees provides industry with greater certainty.
94
95

appropriate entity to manage the proposed fund---thus raising serious questions of the Fund’s
autonomy. On its part, RBPC had suggested in every city, certain frequencies be reserved for
niche channels, and be tendered separately with a low reserve fee and low revenue share
percentage 97 . Similarly, the mechanisms to fund CR attracted differences: some suggested
this be explored but not be part of the initial policy framework, others held government
funding could infringe upon the autonomy of CR 98 . Despite the active and constructive role
of donor agencies in over a decade of advocacy, stakeholders were cautious in endorsing
foreign funding for CR. Lastly, most NGOs argued for limited advertising time being vital to
sustain CR stations 99 ; this was surprising, as the wider interventionist aims of some NGOs
included challenging consumerism in, and through, the media. Taking the pragmatic
approach, in 2009 CRF started to mould a consortium of existing CR stations to collectively
negotiate advertisement rates with agencies---thus preparing for a dialogue with the wider,
commercial milieu of deregulated radio.

NEWS AS CONTENT
Financial viability apart, the more substantial variance, and even ambiguity, is reflected
in FM and CR stakeholders’ approach to the crisis in content. Restrictions on News in both
segments stemmed from government concerns of not just increase in the number of
independent sources but its inability to monitor many such local, low-power, language-based
radio stations. In its consultation paper on II Phase of FM, TRAI made a feeble defence of the
government: “FM mode is best utilized for music broadcast as contrasted with talk
broadcasts”! However, in same document it chose to reason
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“Permission to broadcast News & Current Affairs would serve as an important
means to promote local content and accord local flavour to the channels. The
benefits would be even larger, when these operators are permitted networking, as
then a judicious mix of national, regional/ provincial, local news could be
provided”. 100
The regulator reminded the government that satellite radio services in India, which broadcast
news, are not required to pay any license fees, as they up-link from outside the country.
Perhaps consequently, in its Recommendations for the II Phase, while arguing News would
boost the viability of FM stations, it suggested any review of restriction should consider both,
policies in other media segments and cross-media implications of news on radio.
Responding to TRAI’s views in CP Phase II, although all stakeholders endorsed
permitting the broadcast of news, some had reservations with regard to news of political
nature; a consumer suggested a combination of 80% local news and 20% national &
international news be stipulated, to retain the local bent of FM stations 101 . The RBPC was
forceful in making a case for FM licensees to broadcast News, on various counts. First, the
continued bar was at variance with policies of news on television, print and internet;
moreover FM channels of AIR and private, Satellite radio---currently one, foreign entity 102 --are allowed to broadcast national and international news. Second, because radio was
envisaged as a local medium, the most important local content is indeed news---whose
broadcast will additionally contribute towards meeting a central aim of privatisation i.e.
diversity of content. Thirdly, and as per accepted legal propositions, the possibility of abuse
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or difficulties in monitoring news were not potent grounds to negate the exercise 103 .
Subsequently, in 2007, FICCI adopted the discourse of equity: i.e. news on radio caters to a
large section of rural and urban population who are unable to read newspapers and/or buy TV
sets. In its consultation paper on the III Phase of FM radio, TRAI it mooted a middle ground
of FM stations being permitted to broadcast the exact news content aired by AIR or
Doordarshan. Going a step further in its Recommendations for the III Phase, TRAI called for
FM stations to broadcast news content from UNI, PTI and other authorized news agency
without any substantive change in the content. However, while it advocated enhancing the
limit of FDI from 20% to 49% for stations airing entertainment, for those that may be
permitted news in the future, the enhancement was capped at 26%. After government
maintained its restrictions on news and news-sources---while allowing to air political ads in
2008---TRAI proposed that expansion of sources, and the scope of content to be treated as
news, be reviewed after three years later---thereby, keeping the momentum alive.
AROI was quick to pint out the inflammatory reportage occasionally seen on TV News,
which made a mockery of government “concerns” on allowing news on radio. Quoting its
initiative to pull up the host of a Delhi FM station for derogatory remarks against people from
a certain region---thus championing self-regulatory systems in the FM segment---it did not
forget to underscore that this measure was triggered not by government monitoring but ‘the
alert public’. Addressing the inability of the government to monitor news on radio, it
reminded the government that FM broadcasters across the country could be tracked on the
Internet, sitting in Delhi. Lastly, it emphasised that since the entire license fee is deposited in
advance, the threat of cancelling the license and retaining the fee would be a significant
financial deterrent for responsible news. Consequently, AROI found no reason why TRAI’s
proposal of general radio frequencies being allowed to air 6-7 minutes of news an hour, and
103
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the creation of a category of ‘news channels’, separately registered with the government, be
given the green signal.
The cumulative response of CR activists on News was unexpectedly varied. Some were
satisfied with only news on weather-related warnings; others found the restriction on CR
acceptable as long as it was also applicable to FM 104 . Still others regarded news on CR likely
to be more in tune with community needs than that received from private stations;
simultaneously, there was surprise that the existing bar on news---likely to be termed as
'unreasonable restriction' if challenged in court---was left unchallenged by private FM
operators 105 . The more candid ones opined:
“Commercial radio has had 5 years at least to fight the ban on news and current
affairs, and they have shown no inclination to do so. That does not surprise me.
Commercial organisations do not like to oppose the government, to whom they
have to repeatedly go for all sorts of permissions, connections, help.” 106
Under current regulatory and financial frameworks, CR stations can neither air News nor
afford commercial music. This is undoubtedly a major bottleneck. However, an equally if not
greater bottleneck is created by implicitly assuming such programming types constitute the
totality of desirable content on CR 107 . For one, ‘News’ and ‘Music’ convey the persistence of
inherited understanding of rather hermetic programme types. Furthermore, emphasising the
restrictions on one and the viability of the other brings CR advocates discomforting
proximate to the discourse of commercial FM broadcasters; the discomfort is amplified when
we recall that a key rationale of CR was to respond to the specific needs of local audiences.
All this severely constrains the imagination of the permissible, and possible, canvas of
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programming genres on CR. Fortunately, CRF members interpreted the restrictions to cover
only “political and electoral news”, giving room for CR to undertake other kinds of
reportage. Since definition of what constitutes 'developmental and social programming' and
not 'news and current affairs programming' might entail a grey area, this was seen to provide
latitude to craft creative programming, without “worrying about New Delhi” 108 .

DIVERSITY & CONCENTRATION
Much like News, addressing the inter-related phenomenon of content diversity and
market concentration were equally contentious. In the I Phase of FM, TRAI limited licensees
from owning multiple frequencies in the same city as much to encourage content diversity as
to check possible oligopolies. In contrast, the RBPC believed if a single entity owned more
than one frequency it will be compelled to differentiate its stations---a scenario not
necessarily achieved simply by allowing more licensees within the same city. To encourage
diversity in a manner that bypasses the concerns of oligopoly, the RBPC made a few
proposals: viz. the number of frequencies held by an entity in a city be capped at 3, or 33% of
the total licenses available there; mandating distinct content plans for each frequency bid by
an entity within a city; and, capping the total frequencies an entity could hold nationally at
25% of the frequencies tendered during one phase of auction. It also offered that the right of
the Government or Regulator to break up a monopoly be included in the terms of licensing,
so that chances of litigation are minimised.
NGOs pounced on this, not only because it paved the way for big broadcasters to own
one third of the stations in a city but, it refused to consider concentration through the lens of
cross-media ownership 109 . Recognising multiple licenses in a city may provide a broadcaster
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to have stations in different languages, TRAI’s consultation paper on the II Phase of FM
added nominal safeguards---viz. Shareholding restrictions and enumerations on absolute
numbers or percentage of licenses 110 . But it did make a point of the RBPC benchmarks not
preventing FM broadcasters, despite a 25% cap nationally, to exercise dominance in specified
cities 111 . However, in its recommendations on the II Phase in August 2004, TRAI sought to
strike a balance by emphasising the conjunction of both instruments---viz. dispersed
ownership and multiple licenses---to secure variety in programmes within a city 112 . While it
endorsed the national cap, TRAI voiced doubts over the efficacy of this instrument in an
isolation; for, it was categorical that the preferred approach was a conscious policy on crossmedia ownership---within which the 25% national cap be integrated 113 .
Despite favouring privatisation in general, government found TRAI’s standpoints on
multiple licences and national caps likely to create monopolies, and therefore unacceptable.
But in its next recommendations of November 2004, TRAI defended itself by clarifying it
was aware that the 1995 SC judgment sought preventing unregulated growth of monopolies
under the garb of the guaranteed right of free speech. TRAI continued to maintain that its
proposals, in line with RBPC, contained sufficient checks on monopolies, albeit it could lead
to “some concentration of market share, which is not the same as monopoly” 114 ! Awkwardly
defending multiple licences---without which it failed to see content variety being met---TRAI
again underscored that the control of monopoly through sectoral restrictions was not the apt
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method, another reminder of the need to look at cross-ownership 115 . But the government’s
final Policy Guidelines on the II Phase of FM did not permit multiple licenses in a city, and
stipulated a cap of 15% of all allocated channels in the country. Furthermore, to check the
narrowing of diversity, it stipulated not more than 25% of programming outsourced by a
station be produced by a single content-provider. This essentially meant that the regulator and
government, in equal measure, refrained from adopting instruments of cross-media
ownership---thereby steering the diversity debate away from, and at the cost of, the concerns
of media concentration116 .
After four years of private FM, TRAI re-drew attention to industry’s desire to review
city and national caps 117 . The sectoral trade body, AORI, found the very idea of a national
cap redundant after Parliament passed a wider Competition Act containing norms to check
market concentration across all industries. On its part, the apex trade body, FICCI, rearticulated the issue of media concentration as not one of dominance but of the abuse of
dominance 118 . Leading broadcasters like ‘Radio Mirchi’ stressed the dual benefit of multiple
frequencies: in a milieu of financial fragility, this would facilitate co-owned stations to share
most operational costs; and, it carried the potential of an efficient, market instrument to
promote diverse programming 119 .
In contrast, there were emphatic calls by smaller broadcasters to restrict the
accumulation of interests so as to encourage fresh stations to emerge---which, in turn, hoped
to check monopolies and possibly, promote diversity. Other stakeholders argued for nonmarket instruments to govern diversity, and bestowed faith in mandating a content plan for
115

At the same time, it suggested this issue to be de-linked during Phase II, so as to not delay formulation and roll out of the
II Phase of FM.
116
If during the currency of the permission period, government policy on cross-media ownership is announced, the
permission holder shall be obliged to conform to the revised guidelines within a period of six months from the date of such
notification.
117
TRAI (2008) ‘Consultation Paper On Licensing Issues Relating to 2nd Phase Of Private FM Radio Broadcasting’; Consultation Paper
No. 1 /2008, Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, New Delhi (Jan 8).
118
ibid. p. 22
119
TRAI (2008) ‘Comments on issues related to consultation Paper on 3rd Phase of Private FM Radio Broadcasting’; Telecom Regulatory
Authority of India, New Delhi (Jan 22)

each frequency in a city, irrespective of whether these were held by one or different entities.
Drawing on international experience, some of these firms drew attention to the experiment of
a company owning multiple stations within a city in USA being assessed as a failure 120 .
Instead two concrete mechanisms to spur diversity without permitting multiple frequencies
were proposed: Financial incentives in the form of differential OTEF, or different
percentages of revenue share, for niche and mainstream channels; and, Auctioning Phase-3
stations only after specifying the genre of broadcast, as in UK 121 .
Disregarding the apprehensions and suggestions of divergent voices, TRAI’s
recommendations for the III Phase of FM, February 2008, questioned the empirical and
normative fundamentals of the existing policy regime by stating that the “apprehension of
abuse or monopoly of more channels is baseless” 122 . It found FICCI’s proposal of casting
obligations of different formats of content on multiple frequency-owners had found
consensus among most stakeholders. What it failed to spotlight was that the different formats
proposed---viz. Hindi Contemporary, English, Classical music, Retro (10 years old), Hindi
popular etc.---pertained to formats of music alone, and thus irrelevant to other kinds of
programming. Continuing to play the voice of the major FM broadcasters, TRAI pointed out
….. since allocation of the frequency is through bidding, the choice to select the
program and any mandating in reference to the content may be
discriminatory…….An imposition of limit only throttles the competition,
especially when FM channels are allocated based on open bid. Moreover the
success of auction and availability of channels are not determinable as one time
exercise. Therefore the ceiling of 15% may not work in a fair manner.
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Government observed that although the bidding process itself may ensure a greater number of
operators coming into play when licenses are granted, the possibility of smaller stations being
subsequently taken over by big houses is not ruled out 123 . Moreover, the removal of ceilings
may deter small operators to enter the radio business. Emphasising that the essence of
democracy lay in the presence of a large number of voices, government also found the
removal of 15% limit not being in line with the approach being simultaneously considered for
the entire broadcasting sector in the draft Broadcast Bill 124 . It is noteworthy that on the matter
of multiple licenses, government eased the cap from 33% to 40% of the total channels in a
city subject to a minimum of three different operators plying. While such a mode of
dispersing ownership brings home government’s desires to protect, however partially, small
broadcasters, it equally conveys a grossly narrow understanding of public interest.

Conclusion

There is compelling evidence to infer that the deregulation of radio in India does not
represent the oft-touted thesis of the ‘retreat of the state’. A more nuanced understanding
suggests this be grasped in terms of ‘revisions in the priorities of the state’ 125 . It is here that
the two vectors differentiating our media environment that were highlighted at the outset--viz. rise of new institutional actors and the techno-commercial complexity of our media
ecology---gain tremendous importance at both, the empirical and analytical levels.
Consequently, rather than making a policy framework unnecessary, the trajectory of
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advocacy practices constituting the deregulation of radio have reiterated the necessity of
adopting a coherent set of protocols for policy formulation. Our crisscrossing narratives have
periodically illustrated how these protocols---be they radically new or substantially renewed
in their salience---themselves become a crucial object of advocacy.
Second, stemming from the above, we find two core sets of multiple-tensions that have
marked the interwoven trajectories of FM and CR advocacy. The first is amongst the plethora
of non-state actors, actively aiming to establish, and/or further, particular regimes of media
governance. We note with inquisitiveness, and a degree of paradox, the specific instances
where advocates of one industry-segment deploy the experiences of the other to leverage
their own interests---the approaches to Non-Commercial channels by different stakeholders
being one instance under spotlight. The second tension arises from the state seeking to
incessantly manage its multiple compulsions: of generating revenue through rent or other
means, of encouraging private and non-profit enterprises, and of maintaining minimal levels
of certain irrevocable constitutionally stipulations. And it is in traversing, and balancing,
these compulsions that we witness efforts by the state to gradually redefine inherited
standpoints on rights, entitlements and public interest.
Advocacy for private FM broadcasting has been evidently tempered by wider discourses
of neo-liberalism, for it the views commercialisation of radio as the alternative path to
achieve media democratisation126 . On its part, the incremental campaign for CR drew from
activism by NGOs and proponents of ‘Campus Radio’. This could explain why the long
gestating advocacy on CR got cradled in developmentalism, instead of a rights framework,
like in South Asia as a whole 127 . Nevertheless, these otherwise divergent forces shaping FM
and CR advocacy are equally rooted in the conceptual frame of media reform, as opposed to
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that of media justice 128 .
Both trails of advocacy reveal, however variedly, an underlining construction of
‘community’: embedded in case of FM broadcasters, and interpretive as with CR advocates.
Both have campaigned hard for removing crucial restrictions on News; but in the process,
they have overemphasised the centrality of News in the spectrum of programming possible in
a deregulated milieu. In fact, FM broadcasters have expanded their permissible frameworks
of commerce in a far more systematic manner than that of their canvas of content129 .
Nevertheless, both types of broadcasters have channelled scant investment in the imagination
and creation of other genres of programming. Doing so has bypassed a rigorous engagement
with the crisis of representation in their advocacy and production practices alike 130 . The
inability to traverse this crisis has further bearings on their varied aspirations of encouraging
diversity, irrespective of whether these are visualized through marker or non-market
instruments.
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